AfD: from euroscepticism to Germany’s second-largest party and provisional leader in Saxony-Anhalt
Alternative für Deutschland has gone in just over a decade from failing to enter the Bundestag to securing 20.8% in the 2025 federal election and provisionally reaching 43.8% in Saxony-Anhalt. Its development combines nationalism, opposition to further European integration, restrictive immigration policies and growing scrutiny from German institutions.
· 7 min read

Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) is no longer a marginal party in German politics. In little more than a decade, the party has gone from failing to enter the Bundestag to becoming the second-largest force in the federal Parliament and achieving provisional results that place it as the leading option in some regions of the country.
In the federal elections of September 2013, AfD won 4.7% of the vote, a few tenths below the 5% threshold required to enter the Bundestag. Twelve years later, in the elections of February 2025, it reached 20.8%, more than ten million votes and 152 of the 630 seats in the German Parliament.
The result made the party the second-largest national political force, behind only the bloc formed by CDU and CSU. Its electoral rise was demonstrated once again on 6 September 2026, when AfD provisionally secured 43.8% of the second votes in the regional elections in Saxony-Anhalt, once all 2,661 electoral districts had been counted. In 2021, it had received 20.8% there.
A party born during the euro crisis
AfD was founded in 2013 during the debt and euro crisis. In its early years, it was driven by economists, academics and conservative sectors opposed to European financial bailout policies.
The Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (bpb), Germany’s Federal Agency for Civic Education, described that early party as Eurosceptic, economically liberal and liberal-conservative. The party’s name reflected its desire to challenge the idea, repeatedly expressed during Angela Merkel’s government, that certain European decisions had no alternative.
However, the party underwent an ideological shift from 2014 onwards and, especially, during the 2015 migration crisis. Criticism of the euro gave way to immigration, asylum, national identity, Islam and security as the main focus.
At the same time, national-conservative and right-wing populist currents gained influence within the party, alongside sectors classified by the bpb as far right. Some of the leaders associated with its founding period eventually left the organisation.
National sovereignty and rejection of a federal Europe
AfD’s transformation is also reflected in its official documents. The party expressly rejects the creation of a “United States of Europe” and the transformation of the European Union into a federal state.
Its programme advocates returning powers to national states and proposes a Europe based primarily on sovereign nations. Its stated objective is a “sovereign Germany”, with areas such as welfare, legal certainty and social policies under national responsibility.
It is therefore a conception of European integration considerably more limited than that advocated by Germany’s main parties. AfD’s position is not limited to criticising specific decisions by Brussels, but questions any further transfer of powers to the EU institutions.
Immigration, asylum and the concept of “remigration”
Immigration currently occupies a central place in AfD’s discourse. The party proposes tightening entry, residency, asylum and deportation policies, and has adopted the concept of “remigration”.
In a document approved by its federal leadership in January 2024, the party defines the term as the “measures and incentives” intended to secure the lawful return of foreigners obliged to leave Germany. The same document states that AfD rejects the arbitrary expulsion of foreigners with the right to reside and the expulsion of German citizens of immigrant origin.
This is the party’s official definition and must be distinguished from individual statements by some of its members and from interpretations made by German institutions regarding certain internal currents.
National identity, Islam and the family model
AfD’s basic programme advocates a strongly national conception of society and rejects multiculturalism as a model. On religious matters, the document states that “Islam does not belong to Germany”.
The same text acknowledges that many moderate Muslims live integrated lives, respect the law and form part of German society. Based on this position, the party proposes restricting foreign funding for mosques, introducing controls on imams and banning certain practices.
Its view of German identity also extends to family and demographic policy. AfD presents the family formed by a father, mother and children as the central model, supports policies intended to increase the birth rate and links demographic issues to the preservation of German identity and the German population.
In its official documents, the party maintains that immigration should not be used as the main mechanism for offsetting population decline and advocates a more intensive pro-birth policy.
A foreign policy geared towards national interests
AfD’s foreign policy also differs from the consensus that has dominated much of German politics in recent years. The party advocates a foreign policy focused primarily on national interests, rejects the creation of a European army and believes that NATO should concentrate on its role as a defensive alliance.
It also maintains a more favourable position towards normalising relations with Moscow. Its basic programme expressly calls for an end to sanctions against Russia and an improvement in bilateral relations.
This approach has been maintained in documents published after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In them, AfD acknowledges the suffering caused by the invasion and argues that a solution must be sought through diplomacy.
A growing electoral base
The electoral trajectory shows how the party progressively expanded its support. After receiving 4.7% in 2013, AfD won 12.6% in the 2017 federal elections, a result that enabled it to enter the Bundestag for the first time.
In 2021, it fell back to 10.3%, but reached 15.9% in the 2024 European elections. Finally, in the federal elections of February 2025, it reached 20.8% and took 152 seats.
For years, a significant part of its growth was concentrated in eastern Germany. In 2024, it secured 30.6% in Saxony, 32.8% in Thuringia and 29.2% in Brandenburg.
The difference between east and west remains significant, although the most recent results point to territorial expansion. In March 2026, AfD won 18.8% in Baden-Württemberg and 19.5% in Rhineland-Palatinate, increases of 9.1 and 11.2 percentage points respectively compared with the previous elections.
Its relationship with the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution
AfD’s relationship with the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, has gone through several phases and still has an unresolved legal dimension.
The BfV began to regard AfD as a whole as a Verdachtsfall, approximately a “suspected case” of right-wing extremism, in February 2021. The party appealed the decision. In 2024, the Higher Administrative Court of North Rhine-Westphalia confirmed that there were sufficient grounds and, on 20 May 2025, the Federal Administrative Court refused to hear the appeals brought by AfD. The earlier rulings therefore became final.
The arguments presented by the BfV included suspicions concerning an ethno-cultural conception of national identity that could exclude or assign an inferior status to certain citizens of immigrant origin, as well as indications linked to discrimination against Muslims and other positions contrary to the democratic order.
In May 2025, the BfV began to regard the party as a whole as a confirmed far-right organisation, the German category of gesichert rechtsextremistische Bestrebung. AfD appealed again.
On 26 February 2026, the Cologne Administrative Court issued an interim injunction requiring the BfV to refrain from classifying, monitoring or publicly presenting AfD under that higher category until the main proceedings have concluded at first instance. The case is identified as 13 K 3895/25.
Therefore, as of September 2026, it is not legally correct to present AfD as a whole, without qualification, as an organisation officially classified at federal level as a “confirmed right-wing extremist” organisation. The previous designation as a Verdachtsfall, upheld by the courts, remains in force, while the higher classification is still subject to ongoing proceedings.
A legal party with parliamentary representation
AfD’s situation requires a distinction between the ideology proclaimed by the party, the statements or actions of some of its leaders, and the legal assessments made by constitutional protection bodies.
The fact that the BfV may monitor a party as a suspected case does not mean that the party is banned. AfD remains a legal party, contests elections and has parliamentary representation.
Its group in the Bundestag is currently chaired by Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla, who were also re-elected as the party’s federal co-leaders in July 2026.
Taken as a whole, AfD’s development shows a profound transformation of the German party system. The party that emerged around the euro crisis has become a force focused on national sovereignty, immigration, cultural identity, criticism of Islam, a conservative view of the family, rejection of deeper European integration and a foreign policy more favourable to restoring relations with Russia.
Its electoral results indicate that it can no longer be interpreted solely as a protest party concentrated in the east of the country. The 20.8% won in the 2025 federal elections, the growth recorded in several western states and the provisional 43.8% in Saxony-Anhalt demonstrate the scope of a political phenomenon that continues to evolve.

